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Introduction 
A financial audit is characterized by a relatively structured process in which a company hires 
an independent public accounting firm to express an opinion on its financial statements. Typically 
an audit is completed each year, and consists of an in-depth examination into a company, involving 
a great deal of planning and organization by the auditing firm. Before the audit begins, an audit 
program is designed, which identifies what specific steps must be taken to assure the client's 
financial situation is adequately investigated. An audit senior, typically an auditor with three to five 
years of auditing experience, supervises and evaluates several audit staff members as they work to 
complete the steps in the audit program. 
In the process of completing an audit several behavioral issues can arise. One in particular, 
known as premature sign-off, occurs when a staff auditor reports that he or she completed a 
specified audit step without actually performing the required work. As one might guess, premature 
sign-off is strictly prohibited by auditing firms since its occurrence is potentially harmful both to the 
client and auditing firm. The client is paying for a high quality audit, and has a lot at stake if the 
auditor does not detect a problem in its financial information. The auditing firm could potentially 
face liability for giving an audit opinion that was not merited if the step that was prematurely signed 
off would have revealed information that would have changed the auditor' s opinion. Aside from the 
harm premature sign-off can cause either party, it clearly strays from the professional standards that 
auditors are held closely to and directly reduces the quality of an audit (Kelley and Margheim 1990) 
and therefore demands concern. 
Negative as it is, research shows that premature sign-off has been occurring for over twenty 
years. Many studies have examined auditors ' tendencies to prematurely sign off (Alderman and 
Deitrick 1982; Buchman and Tracy 1982; Kelly and Margheim 1987, 1990; Margheim and Pany 
1986; McNair 1991 ; Rhode 1978). All of these studies have provided valuable insight into factors 
that contribute to premature sign-off, such as time budget pressure and level of experience of the 
staff auditor. Limited studies, however, have examined the organizational response to the discovery 
of premature sign-off. 
The research presented in this paper is an extension ofresearch completed by Kaplan (1995), 
who examined senior auditors ' reporting intentions upon discovery of premature sign-off of an audit 
step by a staff member. His research found that audit seniors do not always formally report the 
discovery of premature sign-off, even though firms have formal policies requiring such reporting 
(McNair 1991). In Kaplan' s (1995) research, an experiment was conducted in which subjects were 
asked to respond to a hypothetical scenario in which an audit staff member prematurely signed off 
on a required audit step. His study manipulated two situational variables: the necessity of the audit 
step skipped and the work history of the staff auditor. He found both variables had an effect on the 
senior auditors ' reporting intentions upon their discovery of a staff member' s premature sign-off. 
Kaplan' s (1995) study also examined the effects of the audit seniors ' gender and audit staff 
evaluation experience on reporting intentions. He found the audit seniors' gender did not affect 
their reporting intentions; however, their level of audit staff evaluation experience did affect their 
reporting intentions. Specifically, audit seniors who had performed more staff evaluations were 
more likely to report the premature sign-off behavior. 
In addition to reporting intentions, two additional dependent variables were investigated by 
Kaplan ( 1995): the participating audit seniors' overall performance rating of the staff auditor and 
their willingness to work with the staff auditor on a future engagement. Kaplan' s ( 1995) research 
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found similar results for the overall performance rating measure as he did for the reporting 
intentions measure. However, the only variable found to affect the audit seniors' willingness to 
work with the staff auditor in the future was the staff auditor' s work history. 
The current paper, as an extension of Kaplan's (1995) research, examined the occurrence of 
premature sign-off and how audit seniors react to the discovery of premature sign-off by a staff 
auditor. Two variables were manipulated: time budget pressure and whether the audit step was 
prematurely signed off intentionally or unintentionally. The current study also examined the effect 
of the audit.seniors' staff evaluation experience, as did Kaplan (1995). In addition, research 
subjects were asked to complete a personality test to determine if they have Type A or Type B 
personality traits so that the effect of this variable could be investigated. The same three dependent 
variables examined by Kaplan (1995) were also examined here: reporting intentions, overall 
performance rating of the staff auditor, and willingness to work with the staff auditor on a future 
engagement. 
The Auditing Environment 
Auditors are driven toward producing a quality audit by several factors , including 
professional standards and liability exposure. The first standard of field work as established by the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICP A) requires the proper supervision of 
assistants (AI CPA 1993 AU Sect. 310.01 ). The AI CPA has also determined "the work of each 
assistant should be reviewed to determine whether it was adequately performed" (AICP A 1993 AU 
Sect. 311 .13). These standards are set to ensure audits maintain high quality standards. In addition 
to authoritative standards, the public influences auditors to sustain high quality standards through 
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their demands. Without confidence a quality audit has been performed, an audit has little value to 
its end users. 
While there are many factors that encourage the maintenance of high audit quality, auditors 
are facing more and more issues that may lower audit quality. Audit consumers are increasingly 
concerned with reducing the costs of audit services, which could lead auditors to rush audit 
procedures and thereby decrease audit quality. In their survey research, Margheim and Kelley 
(1992) found the most common audit billing arrangement currently used is a fixed-fee contract. 
This method contrasts sharply with the hourly billing procedure that historically was the most 
common billing arrangement. A fixed-fee contract encourages auditors to complete the audit in the 
most efficient manner, and thereby may lead to decreased audit quality. 
To counteract pressures to decrease audit quality, most firms have established formal 
policies which state severe consequences for certain audit quality reduction acts, or behaviors that 
are considered to directly reduce audit quality. Audit quality reduction acts include a wide range of 
prohibited behaviors, including premature sign-off on an audit procedure, reducing the amount of 
work performed on an audit step below what is considered reasonable, failing to research an 
accounting principle, making superficial reviews of client documents, and accepting weak client 
explanations (Kelley and Margheim 1990). While the standard punishments for these behaviors 
vary, McN air ( 1991) found the formal punishment for premature sign-off is generally dismissal. 
This harsh formal punishment is intended to deter auditors from participating in such severe audit 
quality reduction acts. 
Ultimately, auditors must work in a "zone of compromise" (McNair 1991 ), to balance the 
cost versus quality dilemma they face on a regular basis. Informal networks within auditing firms 
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are used to help maintain a balance between cost and quality (Dirsmith and Covaleski 1985). 
Informal networks are used by partners and managers of firms to communicate information in a 
more personal manner as opposed to more formal means. This information ultimately trickles down 
to senior and staff auditors and is typically accessed within the first two years of an auditor's 
employment (Dirsmith and Covaleski 1985). Dirsmith and Covaleski (1985) found that auditors 
prefer to receive information via informal means rather than through more bureaucratic methods 
because it is easier to obtain and is available earlier in their careers. Informal networks can be used 
to communicate information that strays from documented firm policies. These ideas, or 
countemorms, are used to bypass the stated norms. McNair (1991) asserts these countemorms arise 
from the cost versus quality dilemma. In this way firms can continue to maintain strict formal 
policies, and can communicate different standards through informal networks to guide behavior. 
As mentioned above, dismissal generally represents the formal punishment for premature 
sign-off and other audit quality reduction acts (McNair 1991 ). However, McNair (1991) found 
selective enforcement of these policies in many instances, based on a case by case evaluation. 
Selective enforcement of firm policies may stem from the informal networks that exist within 
auditing firms which McN air ( 1991) states are used to balance the cost versus quality dilemma. 
Such organizational culture may suggest compliance with formal firm policies is discretionary. 
Audit quality reduction acts have been occurring for many years. Research attests that 
premature sign-off behavior, in particular, has been occurring with some consistency for at least 
twenty years. Rhode' s ( 1978) survey research found that 60 percent of auditors admitted to having 
prematurely signed off on a required audit procedure. In a similar endeavor, Alderman and Deitrick 
(1982) found 31 percent of their respondents indicated they believed that auditors have prematurely 
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signed-off on required audit steps. Another research study by McNair ( 1991) found that 20 percent 
of auditors surveyed admitted engaging in premature sign-off behavior. 
Most of the research that has been conducted on premature sign-off has been from the 
perspective of the auditors committing the premature sign off, in an attempt to understand what 
motivates such behavior. Rhode (1978) found staff auditors and below are more likely than more 
experienced auditors to engage in premature sign-off. Similarly, Alderman and Deitrick (1982) 
found the auditors prematurely signing off required steps were most likely staff auditors or below 
(39 percent) and least likely to be partners (11 percent). In addition to level of experience, the 
necessity of the audit step contributes to premature sign-off behavior (Rhode 1978, Alderman and 
Deitrick 1982). Even though audit programs are intended only to include necessary and important 
audit procedures, occasionally, during the course of the audit, a step is deemed to be unnecessary 
because other audit procedures sufficiently test the assertion. 
Rhode (1978) found that the primary motivating factor for premature sign off is time budget 
pressure. Time budget pressure is defined as pressure to complete the audit within certain time 
constraints. (These time constraints can vary widely from one audit to the next.) In addition, Kelly 
and Margheim (1990) found a positive relationship between time budget pressure and audit quality 
reduction acts, including premature sign-off, up to a budget that was "very tight, practically 
unattainable." 
While significant research has examined the motivation for auditors to prematurely sign-off, 
little has been done to explore the managerial response to the discovery of premature sign-off. 
Kaplan (1995) began a new stream ofresearch by looking at factors that influence a firm ' s response 
to premature sign-off by audit staff. Specifically, he examined the reporting intentions of audit 
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seniors upon learning an audit staff member under their supervision had prematurely signed off on a 
required audit step. The motivation for this new research direction was to examine whether senior 
auditors will always comply with organizational policy and report such incidents, or if the audit 
senior would react in a different way under certain conditions. Knowing that particular factors can 
lead a staff auditor to prematurely sign-off, Kaplan (1995) sought to determine if some of the same 
factors would affect an audit senior's reaction to the discovery of premature sign-off. 
Regardless of the staff member's motivation, the audit senior is responsible for formally 
reporting all discovered occurrences of audit quality reduction acts, such as premature sign-off, in a 
staff member's evaluation at the end of an audit. A partner in the firm would typically follow up on 
the evaluation by carrying out a disciplinary action. Since the formal punishment for premature 
sign-off is generally dismissal from the firm, an audit senior might be hesitant to report all instances 
of premature sign-off that are discovered. Seniors may also be reluctant to always follow formal 
firm policies because of the counternorms present within the firms (which, again, are due to the cost 
versus quality dilemma they constantly face). Staff auditors may know about these counternorms 
via their organization's informal networks, leading to behavior that may be contrary to formal firm 
policy. 
Kaplan (1995) found an audit senior will more likely formally report the findings of 
premature sign-off under certain conditions. Kaplan (1995) performed an experiment in which audit 
seniors read a hypothetical scenario describing their discovery of an audit staff member who 
prematurely signed off a required audit step. The audit seniors were then asked to give their 
response to this discovery. Kaplan' s (1995) experiment manipulated the necessity of the audit step 
prematurely signed-off (necessary versus unnecessary) as well as the work history of the audit staff 
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member (good versus poor). Kaplan' s (1995) results showed that audit seniors' reporting 
intentions were much greater when the audit step was necessary or when the audit staff member had 
a poor work history. Kaplan (1995) also found that audit seniors who have had more experience in 
completing performance appraisals are more likely to report the incidence of premature sign-off. 
The current research used essentially the same method and format as Kaplan (1995) to investigate 
additional factors that may contribute to an audit senior' s response to premature sign-off. 
Hypotheses 
Prior research has shown that time budget pressure acts as the primary motivating factor for 
a staff auditor' s premature sign-off (Rhode 1978). Kelly and Margheim (1990) also found there is a 
positive relationship between time budget pressure and the likelihood of engaging in audit quality 
reduction acts. The fact that a staff auditor has been under time budget pressure prior to prematurely 
signing off an audit step may influence audit seniors' reporting decisions. Having previously 
worked as an audit staff member, the senior may be able to relate to time budget pressures 
experienced by staff members. Also, an audit senior is charged with supervising staff members and 
making sure that the time budget is met on every audit. Therefore, his or her job performance is 
threatened if a staff auditor goes over the time budget, and he or she may be more lenient toward a 
staff member who prematurely signs off under pressure of a tight time budget in order to meet the 
budget. On the other hand, if the staff member was not under significant time budget pressure, a 
senior may have less sympathy for the staff member who prematurely signed-off on an audit step. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested. 
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Hypothesis 1. Senior auditors ' propensity to formally report premature sign-off behavior will 
be greater when the staff member 's premature sign-off behavior occurs under conditions of an 
easy time budget. 
No research has been done on intentional versus unintentional premature sign-off of an audit 
step. For the purpose of this research, unintentional premature sign-off was defined as premature 
sign-off on an audit procedure as a result of confusion concerning what needed to be done. An audit 
senior may feel this kind of situation should not be formally reported due to the staff member' s 
intentions. The senior may also blame him or herself for inadequately supervising the individual, 
and therefore may be resistant to formally reporting the incident. Intentional premature sign-off, on 
the other hand, implies the staff member did not perform the step even though he or she knew it was 
required. This situation should result in less sympathy by the audit senior, and may lead him or her 
to formally report the occurrence. Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested. 
Hypothesis 2. Senior auditors ' propensity to formally report premature sign-off behavior will 
be greater when the staff member who engages in the premature sign-off behavior did so 
intentionally. 
No research has been conducted on the behavior of audit seniors with Type A or Type B 
personalities regarding the discovery of premature sign-off by an audit staff member. Type A 
behavior is characterized primarily by the "combination of highly competitive achievement 
orientation, a sense of time urgency, and excessive hostility in response to frustration." In contrast, 
Type B behavior is more emotional and possesses fewer Type A traits (Sanders and Malkis 1982). 
Kelley and Margheim (1990) found audit staff members are more concerned about time budgets and 
are more likely to underreport their time under the supervision of a senior with a Type A 
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personality. While this research did not examine the occurrence of premature sign-off in relation to 
a senior's Type A personality, it seems reasonable that a concern about time budgets may also 
correspond to a higher instance of premature sign-off under tight time budget pressure and the 
supervision by a senior with Type A personality traits. No research has examined whether Type A 
seniors react differently to the occurrence of premature sign-off, and the current hypothesis suggests 
that perhaps seniors with Type A personalities will react differently to the discovery of premature 
sign-off. Type A personality characteristics may lead a senior to be worried about getting the audit 
done within the time budget over and above other audit concerns due to the Type A emphasis on 
time urgency. Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested. 
Hypothesis 3. Senior auditors ' propensity to formally report premature sign-off behavior will 
be greater for audit seniors who do not display Type A personality traits. 
Kaplan (1995) found the propensity to formally report an incidence of premature sign-off 
was greater when the senior had more staff appraisal experience. Research completed prior to 
Kaplan's (1995) indicated an auditor's work experience may have a strong influence onjudgment. 
Experience in completing performance evaluations may cultivate a high regard for auditor equality, 
and thereby increase reporting tendencies. Not disciplining a staff member for premature sign-off 
behavior would be considered unfair to other staff members who encountered time budget pressures 
without turning to audit quality reduction acts. The current research will examine the hypothesis 
again to determine the generalizability of Kaplan's (1995) findings. 
Hypothesis 4. Senior auditors' propensity to formally report premature sign-off behavior will 
be greater for auditors with more staff appraisal experience. 
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Method 
Task 
Audit seniors and managers, who all work for the same firm, were given case materials 
describing a hypothetical audit client, A-1 Appliances. Each of the individuals worked 
independently in completing the case. Materials were adapted from a case by Kaplan (1995) and 
included information that remained constant across all cases, including an overview of the company 
and its production cycle and financial statements for the current and prior year. This information 
was included in case materials primarily to provide context for the research subjects. Also included 
in the case was information about Laura Smith, an audit staff member under the supervision of the 
participating auditor. In all cases, Laura, having a good reputation in the office for being competent 
and hard working, prematurely signed-off on an audit step that was subsequently determined by the 
audit senior to be unnecessary. An unnecessary audit step and good work history of the staff 
member displayed greater variations in responses in Kaplan's (1995) research and, therefore, would 
be less likely to influence the responses ofresearch subjects in the current study. 
Participants were asked first to read the information about A-1 Appliances and Laura's work 
on the audit, and then to provide several appraisal judgments. The research subjects also answered 
background questions and questions to determine their personality type. A sample of the case 
materials is included in Appendix A. The sample case provided is the version with intentional 
premature sign off by the staff auditor under a tight time budget (see below for further discussion of 
the four versions of the case). 
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Independent Variables 
Four versions of the case were prepared based upon the levels of two independent variables 
(time budget pressure and intent). Time budget pressure and intent were manipulated between 
subjects. Thus, each participating auditor was asked to reply to one scenario describing premature 
sign-off behavior. Two other pieces of data (personality type and experience level) were obtained 
from the participating auditors as well. 
Time Budget Pressure 
Two levels oftime budget pressure were constructed. Under the tight time budget pressure 
scenario, the case read, in part, " ... you believed that it would be VERY DIFFICULT (in fact, nearly 
impossible) to meet the inventory budget." Alternatively, under the easy time budget scenario, the 
case read, in part, " .. . you believed that it would be FAIRLY EASY to meet [the inventory budget] ." 
In all versions of the case, Laura completed the audit work in the budgeted amount of time, but 
would have gone over budget if she had not prematurely signed off. 
Intentional versus Unintentional Premature Sign-Off 
Two scenarios for intent were constructed. Under the intentional premature sign-off 
scenario, the case read, in part, "When you discussed the matter with Laura, she said she 
INTENTIONALLY SKIPPED the step because she felt it was important to not go over budget and 
she thought the step was unnecessary." Alternatively, for the unintentional premature sign-off 
scenario, the case read, in part, "When you discussed the matter with Laura, she indicated that she 
found the audit step requirements unclear and that she was uncertain how much work needed to be 
done .. . You conclude that Laura' s premature sign-off of the audit step was probably an 
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UNINTENTIONAL MISTAKE. However, you also believe there should have been enough doubt in 
Laura's mind about the proper interpretation of the audit step that she should have asked you about 
it up front." 
Personality Type 
Participating auditors were asked to complete a nine question self-evaluation to determine 
their personality type (Type A or Type B). The questions were taken from the Sales Type A 
personality scale (Sales 1969) as refined by Caplan (1972) and Jolly (1979). All subjects were given 
the same questions, which were included as part of the biographical data each auditor completed. 
Evaluation Experience of Senior 
Participating auditors were asked the question, "How many times have you evaluated the 
performance of a staff auditor?" Responses from this question were used in data analysis. This 
question was included as a part of the biographical data each auditor completed. 
Dependent Variables 
The participating auditors were asked to read the case scenario and then complete several 
questions regarding their performance evaluation of Laura, the staff auditor who prematurely signed 
off the audit step. Following each audit engagement, the senior in-charge auditor completes a 
performance evaluation on each staff member who was a part of the audit team. The questions in 
this case revolved around this end-of-audit evaluation. These evaluations are used by the firm to 
make decisions regarding salaries, promotions, and future work assignments (Harrell and Wright 
1990), and are therefore of ultimate importance to the firm. By having each research subject answer 
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questions about his or her evaluation of Laura, the current research was able to assess the auditors' 
reporting tendencies, their overall performance rating for Laura, and the likelihood the participating 
auditor would support working with Laura on future engagements. 
Reporting Intentions 
To measure the senior auditors ' reporting intentions, participating auditors responded to the 
question, "Given Laura's performance as described in this case, how likely is it that your written 
evaluation of Laura would include the fact that she did not perform an audit step that she signed 
off?" The response scale ranged from "1," which was labeled "Extremely UNLIKELY to include in 
written evaluation" to "7," which was labeled "Extremely UK.ELY to include in written 
evaluation." Although in actual encounters with premature sign-off auditors must choose either to 
report or not to report, the seven point scale has certain advantages. Participating auditors may be 
unwilling to reveal their actual intentions with a dichotomous variable. Further, participating 
auditors may not feel that they had been given enough information in the case to make a definite 
decision. Kaplan ( 1995) used a similar question and scale in his research. 
Overall Performance Rating 
When an audit senior completes a performance evaluation, he or she generally has to give 
each staff member an overall performance rating. This rating could be adversely affected by the 
discovery of premature sign-off as reflected in the rating of "Unacceptable." To evaluate this 
possibility, participating auditors were asked the question, "In your written evaluation of Laura' s 
performance, how likely is it that you would evaluate her overall performance as "Unacceptable" 
because of the fact that she did not perform an audit step that she signed off?" The response scale 
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ranged from "1," which was labeled "Extremely UNLIKELY to evaluate as 'Unacceptable" ' to "7," 
which was labeled "Extremely LIKELY to evaluate as 'Unacceptable."' Kaplan (1995) asked a 
similar question in his research. 
Audit Team Support 
To measure the audit team support, the participating auditors were asked the question, "To 
what extent would you support Laura' s request to be assigned to you on another engagement?" The 
response scale range from "1," which was labeled "Would NOT SUPPORT Laura' s request" to "7," 
which was labeled "Would strongly SUPPORT Laura' s request." This question was also used by 
Kaplan (1995) in his research. Note that this scale differs slightly from the response scales in the 
other two dependent measures. For this measure, a smaller rating is indicative of a more negative 
response to Laura' s premature sign-off behavior. In the reporting intentions and performance rating 
measures a higher rating corresponds to a more harsh reaction to the premature sign-off. 
Participating Auditors 
Participating auditors were "in charge" auditors and audit managers who supervise audit 
engagements on a day-to-day basis and perform evaluations of staff members at the end of audit 
engagements. All auditors worked for the same firm. Ninety-one cases were distributed, and 58 
cases were returned. Three auditors failed one of two manipulation checks. One manipulation 
check was included for each independent variable that was manipulated--time budget pressure and 
intent. Therefore, the results reported here are based on the 55 cases that were completed correctly. 
As shown in Table 1, the mean level of experience and number of staff auditors evaluated by the 
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participating auditors was 58 months and 40 appraisals, respectively. Thirty-eight percent of the 
participating auditors were female and 62% were male. 
Table 1 also presents information about the participants' personal experience with premature 
sign-off. Twenty percent of auditors surveyed stated they had encountered intentional premature 
sign-off by an audit staff member under their supervision. Over 90% responded that they had 
experience with unintentional premature sign-off by audit staff members. These figures suggest that 
unintentional premature sign-off is quite commonplace, and is dealt with often in public accounting 
firms. Kaplan ( 1995) found that one-third of participants in his study had encountered premature 
sign-off of an audit staff member. However, his questionnaire did not delineate between intentional 
and unintentional premature sign-off, a fact noted by Kaplan (1995) (his intent was to learn about 
his participating auditors' experience with intentional premature sign-off). Kaplan's (1995) figure 
is 50% higher than the current finding of a 20% rate of intentional premature sign-off, which may 
indicate that some of Kaplan's (1995) respondents were including unintentional premature sign-off 
as a qualifying experience with premature sign-off. 
Also presented in Table 1 are the results of the personality test which was completed by each 
participating auditor. Lower scores indicate a higher presence of Type A personality traits, while 
higher scores indicate an individual is more likely to be classified as Type B. Given that the 
possible range of scores was 9 through 63, the mean score of 24.54 indicates that the participating 
auditors as a whole tend to be more Type A individuals than Type B. 
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Results 
Analysis-of-covariance (ANCOVA) was used to determine the statistical association 
between the independent variables and each of the three dependent measures. The covariates in the 
model were the audit seniors' gender, personality type, and evaluation experience. The model also 
included two manipulated variables, time budget pressure and intent. ANCOVA results are 
presented in Table 2, and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. Table 3 includes the mean, 
standard deviation, minimum score, first quartile, median, third quartile, and maximum score. 
Panel A in each table presents the results for the reporting intentions dependent measure, which 
found the likelihood of the senior auditor reporting the premature sign-off behavior in a written 
evaluation of the staff member. Panel Bin each table displays results for the performance appraisal 
dependent measure, the variable that asked senior auditors to determine how likely it is they would 
classify the staff member' s overall performance as "Unacceptable." The audit team support 
dependent measure is included in Panel C of each table to present findings on the audit seniors' 
willingness to work with the staff member on future engagements. 
Reporting Intentions 
The dependent measure of greatest interest in this study is the reporting intentions measure, 
since auditing firms have strict rules requiring audit seniors to report the incidences of premature 
sign-off that they discover. Results which can demonstrate that audit seniors' compliance with this 
rule are influenced by certain variables are clearly of interest. The other two dependent variables 
(the performance appraisal measure and the audit team support measure) are exploratory in nature, 
and were included to provide additional insight into an audit senior' s reaction to premature sign-off 
by a staff member. They also allow for a comparison with Kaplan' s (1995) results. 
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In accordance with the first hypothesis, this study's results suggest that a senior auditor's 
propensity to formally report will be greater when the staff member's premature sign-off occurs 
under conditions of an easy time budget. As shown in Table 2 Panel A, budget pressure is 
significant (p=.01). The mean values reported in Table 3 Panel A show that participants were more 
likely to report the occurrence of premature sign-off under an easy time budget (4.5 for tight budget 
pressure versus 5.8 for easy budget pressure). In addition, median scores indicate a difference in the 
auditors' reporting intentions under a tight time budget and an easy time budget. The median score 
of 7 in the instance of an easy time budget indicates that at least 50% of respondents would 
definitely report the occurrence under such conditions. On the other hand, under a tight time budget 
the median score is 4.5, indicating only a slight inclination to formally report the discovery of 
premature sign-off under a tight time budget by at least 50% of respondents. 
The second hypothesis stated that senior auditors' propensity to formally report would be 
greater if the premature sign-off behavior was intentional. Table 2 Panel A shows that intent is 
significant (p=.01), and the mean scores displayed in Table 3 Panel A show that audit seniors were 
more likely to report if the premature sign-off was intentional (5.7 for intentional sign-off versus 4.5 
for unintentional sign-off). 
The third hypothesis considered whether a respondent's personality type would affect his or 
her response to premature sign-off. The results presented in Table 2 Panel A indicate that 
personality type is not a significant factor (p=.12). It appears that the personality type of the 
participating auditors did not have a significant effect on their reporting intentions. 
The fourth research hypothesis was intended to test the generalizability of Kaplan' s ( 1995) 
findings when he tested the same hypothesis and found that auditors with more staff appraisal 
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experience were more likely to formally report the occurrence of premature sign-off. Table 2 Panel 
A indicates that staff appraisal experience is, in fact, marginally significant (p=.09), and the 
covariate coefficient for evaluation experience is positive. This result re-affirms Kaplan' s (1995) 
findings that more experienced auditors are more likely to report the discovery of premature sign-
off 
Performance Appraisal 
This analysis examined the association between the independent variables and the overall 
performance rating. The dependent measure was the likelihood of evaluating the performance of the 
staff member as "Unacceptable" because she did not perform an audit step that she signed off. 
ANCOV A was used to test for associations with the dependent measure. Table 2 Panel B gives 
statistical results of this analysis, and Table 3 Panel B displays descriptive statistics for this 
measure. Of the two manipulated variables, only intent was determined to be significant (p<.01), as 
shown in Table 2 Panel B. Means displayed in Table 3 Panel B give evidence that participating 
auditors were more likely to classify the staff auditor's overall performance as "Unacceptable" when 
the behavior was intentional (3.4 for intentional sign-off versus 1.8 for unintentional sign-off). A 
maximum score of 4 was given for the performance appraisal measure for unintentional premature 
sign-off, indicating that all respondents were only marginally willing to assess the staff auditor' s 
overall performance as "Unacceptable" under this condition. In contrast, the maximum score under 
intentional premature sign-off was 7, or "extremely likely to evaluate as 'Unacceptable."' 
Also significant under the performance appraisal measure was senior auditors ' evaluation 
experience (p=.06), as shown in Table 2 Panel B. (As with the analysis in Panel A, the covariate 
coefficient for evaluation experience is positive.) This finding provides evidence that seniors who 
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have completed more staff evaluations are more likely to classify the behavior of an auditor who 
prematurely signs off a required step as "Unacceptable." 
Audit Team Support 
The audit team support dependent measure examined the likelihood that, given the audit 
staff member' s behavior, the senior would support working with the staff member in the future. 
ANCOV A analysis identified the association between the independent variables and audit team 
support. Table 2 Panel C and Table 3 Panel C give the statistical results and descriptive statistics of 
this analysis, respectively. Consistent with the reporting intentions measure, the only significant 
manipulated variable was intent (p=.04). Table 3 Panel C displays the mean scores for both 
intentional and unintentional premature sign-off, and indicates that respondents were more likely to 
support working with a staff member who unintentionally signed off prematurely (mean= 5.3) than 
a staff member who did so intentionally (mean= 4.5). No other variable acheived statistical 
significance. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Studies indicate that premature sign-off has been occurring with some regularity for many 
years. This behavior is considered a severe audit quality reduction act, and has the potential to 
significantly harm an auditing firm. An auditor may issue an opinion on the fairness of a set of 
financial statements based on evidence that does not exist because a vital step was prematurely 
signed off. This may lead to negative financial aspects of a company being overlooked and not 
taken into account when the opinion is made. When creditors or potential stockholders are relying 
on these financial statements, they could be led to believe that a company is in a good financial 
position when it may actually have some significant problems. Premature sign-off potentially has a 
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snowball effect--at the time of the premature sign-off it may seem insignificant and minor, yet the 
repercussions may be very damaging. 
The issue at hand, then, involves the motivation for premature sign-off. What causes it to 
continue to occur, despite its potentially harmful effects? Prior studies hwe indicated that 
organizational culture may not always conform with formal firm policy, leading certain behaviors to 
occur even though formal firm policy restricts the behavior (Dirsmith and Covaleski 1985; McNair 
1991 ). This may be the reason that premature sign-off continues to occur, despite the fact that firm 
policies typically strictly forbid the behavior. 
The purpose of this study was to examine whether audit seniors always comply with the 
reporting requirements of their firm in conjunction with the discovery of premature sign-off. 
Kaplan (1995) found that necessity of the audit step and staff member work history may affect a 
senior auditor's propensity to formally report the discovery of premature sign-off. A review of the 
relevant literature suggested that other factors may also affect the likelihood of a discovered instance 
of premature sign-off being reported. The current work extends Kaplan's (1995) study by testing 
three other variables' influence on the reporting intentions of the senior auditor. These variables 
consisted of time budget pressure, intent of the staff member in committing the premature sign-off, 
and the personality type of the senior auditor. 
Results of this study indicate that under conditions of intentional premature sign-off by a 
staff member, a senior auditor is 1) more likely to formally report the incident, 2) more likely to 
classify the overall performance of the staff auditor as "Unacceptable," and 3) less likely to support 
working with the staff member in the future. As expected, results showed that intentional premature 
21 
sign-off is viewed more negatively by senior auditors than unintentional premature sign-off (i.e., 
premature sign-off due to confusion over the requirements of the audit step). 
This study also indicated premature sign-off is more likely to be included in the formal 
written evaluation of a staff auditor if it occurred under an easy time budget. (The easy time budget 
scenario indicated that the staff auditor should have had adequate time to complete all requirements 
and was under no time urgency to finish the necessary tasks in the audit step.) This result was also 
expected since prior research has shown that time budget pressure is the primary motivating factor 
for premature sign-off (Rhode 1978). When there is extensive time budget pressure, it is placed 
both upon the staff member and the audit senior, so it is reasonable to hypothesize that the presence 
oftime budget pressure may influence a senior's reporting tendencies. The findings reported above 
support the notion that all premature sign-off behavior is not treated equally, as firm policies would 
require. Instead, this study's results support prior studies which found that formal firm rules may be 
subject to interpretation. 
These conclusions are supported by Table 4, which reports the means of the participating 
auditors' responses to the manipulated variables. Results are presented for each dependent measure. 
Panel A presents data for the reporting intentions measure, which is the dependent measure of 
primary interest. As shown in the table, comparison of these means shows that intentional 
premature sign-off that occurred under an easy time budget was the most likely scenario to be 
formally reported by the audit senior (with a mean of 6.24). In contrast, a situation of premature 
sign-off under a tight time budget that was unintentional was seen in a more favorable light by 
participating audit seniors (with a mean of 3.92). 
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Table 4 displays similar results for the other dependent measures in Panel B and Panel C, the 
performance appraisal measure and the audit team support measure, respectively. Intentional 
premature sign-off under an easy time budget reports the highest mean for the performance appraisal 
measure in Panel B (3.71). Similar to the findings for the reporting intentions measure, this leads to 
the conclusion that senior auditors are more likely to classify the overall performance of a staff 
auditor who commits intentional premature sign-off which occurs under little or no time budget 
pressure as "Unacceptable." Panel C also supports the notion that senior auditors are more critical 
of a staff auditor who prematurely signs off intentionally under an easy time budget. This is 
evidenced by a mean of 4.41 in the corresponding cell in Table 4, which is the smallest mean of the 
four possible scenarios. (Remember that for Panel C, the audit team support measure, a smaller 
mean represents less audit team support.) 
The current study also confirmed Kaplan's (1995) research which found that reporting 
tendencies were stronger among participants with more evaluation experience. This suggests that as 
an auditor gains more experience evaluating staff members, the less tolerant he or she is of 
premature sign-off. As Kaplan (1995) concluded, this may result from the auditor becoming more 
concerned with staff auditor equality as he or she gains more evaluation experience. 
This research supports prior studies on premature sign-off in finding that premature sign-off 
occurs and that it is not always reprimanded. Beyond prior research, however, this study provides 
additional insight into why premature sign-off continues to occur. Until premature sign-off is 
viewed as strictly prohibited under all circumstances and staff auditors understand that all 
discovered instances will be reported, it will continue to occur and potentially degrade audit quality. 
If senior auditors take the results of this study and alter their behavior when evaluating a staff 
auditor who prematurely signs off, perhaps the perception that premature sign-off rules are 
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selectively enforced will change. Ultimately, a change in perceptions of staff auditors could lead to 
higher quality audits in the future. 
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TABLE 1 
PROFILE OF PARTICIPATING AUDITORS (N=55) 
PANEL A: CONTINUOUS MEASURES 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
Months of Audit Experience 
Number of Staff Auditors Evaluated 
Personality Type (A/B) 
(Range= 9 - 63) 
57.86 
(28.40) 
39.98 
(41.71) 
24.54 
(7.03) 
PANEL B: DICHOTOMOUS MEASURES 
Gender: Male 
Female 
Personal determination of intentional premature 
sign-off behavior by audit staff member 
Personal determination of unintentional premature 
sign-off behavior by audit staff member 
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Number of 
Responses 
34 
21 
11 
50 
Mean 
62% 
38% 
20% 
91% 
TABLE2 
ANALYSIS OF CO-VARIANCE RESULTS 
PANEL A: REPORTING INTENTIONS MEASURE 
Source F-Value Probability 
Gender 2.22 0.14 
Evaluation Experience 3.00 0.09 
Personality 2.57 0.12 
Budget Pressure 6.64 0.01 
Intent 4.76 0.03 
Budget Pressure x Intent 0.00 1.00 
PANEL B: PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL MEASURE 
Source 
Gender 
Evaluation Experience 
Personality 
Budget Pressure 
Intent 
Budget Pressure x Intent 
F-Value 
2.23 
3.70 
0.12 
0.01 
15.90 
0.46 
Probability 
0.14 
0.06 
0.73 
0.91 
0.00 
0.50 
PANEL C: AUDIT TEAM SUPPORT MEASURE 
Source F-Value Probability 
Gender 0.00 0.96 
Evaluation Experience 1.29 0.26 
Personality 0.05 0.83 
Budget Pressure 0.00 0.97 
Intent 4.31 0.04 
Budget Pressure x Intent 0.00 0.96 
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TABLE3 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
PANEL A: REPORTING INTENTIONS MEASURE 
Experimental Standard Minimum First Third Maximum 
Treatment Mean Deviation Score Quartile Median Quartile Score 
Tight Budget Pressure 4.5 1.7 2 3 4.5 6 7 
Easy Budget Pressure 5.8 1.5 2 5 7 7 7 
Intentional 5.7 1.6 2 5 6 7 7 
Unintentional 4.5 1.7 2 3 5 6 7 
PANEL B: PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL MEASURE 
Experimental Standard Minimum First Third Maximum 
Treatment Mean Deviation Score Quartile Median Quartile Score 
Tight Budget Pressure 2.6 1.4 1 1 2.5 4 5 
Easy Budget Pressure 2.8 1.9 1 1.5 2 3 7 
Intentional 3.4 1.7 1 2 3 5 7 
Unintentional 1.8 1.0 1 1 2 2 4 
PANEL C: AUDIT TEAM SUPPORT MEASURE 
Experimental Standard Minimum First Third Maximum 
Treatment Mean Deviation Score Quartile Median Quartile Score 
Tight Budget Pressure 4.9 1.3 2 4 5 6 7 
Easy Budget Pressure 4.8 1.8 1 4 5 6 7 
Intentional 4.5 1.8 1 3 5 5 7 
Unintentional 5.3 1.0 3 5 5.5 6 7 
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TABLE4 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY TREATMENT MEASURE 
PANEL A: REPORTING INTENTIONS MEASURE 
Tight 
Budget 
Pressure 
Easy 
Budget 
Pressure 
Intentional 
5.07 
(1.77) 
6.24 
(1.25) 
Unintentional 
3.92 
(1.56) 
5.17 
(1.75) 
PANEL B: PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL MEASURE 
Tight 
Budget 
Pressure 
Easy 
Budget 
Pressure 
Intentional 
3.07 
(1.33) 
3.71 
(1.99) 
Unintentional 
2.08 
(1.24) 
1.58 
(0.52) 
PANEL C: AUDIT TEAM SUPPORT MEASURE 
Tight 
Budget 
Pressure 
Easy 
Budget 
Pressure 
Intentional 
4.57 
(1.34) 
4.41 
(2.06) 
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Unintentional 
5.33 
(0.99) 
5.33 
(1.07) 
Appendix A 
A-1 Appliances Audit Case 
Assume that you are the auditor in charge of the audit of A-1 Appliances, a publicly held company which 
manufactures a complete line of commercial and residential water heaters. The firm is one of many 
companies in the water heater industry and is of medium size in relation to its competitors. 
A-1 has been in operation for over 30 years. Your firm has conducted the audit for the past four years 
during which a good working relationship with A-1 has been established. A-1 has a May 31 year end. 
John Green, who has been with the firm three years, is the CEO of A-1 Appliances. He has considerable 
experience in the industry and is known in the community as an individual with high integrity. 
Management places a strong emphasis on setting and achieving financial targets. As such, bonuses are 
given to key management employees who meet their targets. Adequate operating budgets exist for the 
internal audit department and the accounting department; both are made up of professionals with 
adequate qualifications. 
In terms of economic performance, A-1 has had an average annual growth rate in sales of about six 
percent over the past decade ( 1987-1996). Bond covenants are not in threat of violation. 
Relevant summarized financial information for the current and prior year are presented below and on the 
next page. 
Sales 
Cost of Sales 
Gross Profit 
Other Expenses 
Income Before Taxes 
Income Taxes 
Net Income 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
A-1 Appliances Mfg. Co., Inc. 
Income Statement 
For the years ending 5/31/96 & 5/31/95 
Unaudited 
(in $000s) 
12.2.Q 
$91,425 
42,882 
48,543 
41,931 
6,612 
--1222 
CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE 
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Audited 
(in $000s) 
1225. 
$87,320 
39,194 
48,126 
42,006 
6,120 
-1...9% 
ASSETS 
Current Assets: 
Cash and Securities 
Accounts Receivable (Net) 
Inventory 
Raw Material 
Work in Process 
Finished Goods 
Total 
Prepaids 
Total Current Assets 
Fixed Assets (Net) 
Total Assets 
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 
Current Liabilities 
Long Term Debt: 
Bonds Payable, 9% 
(due 12/31/2008) 
Deferred Taxes 
Total Liabilities 
Equity 
Total Liabilities and Equity 
A-1 Appliances Mfg. Co., Inc. 
Balance Sheet 
As of 5/31 /96 & 5/31/95 
$6,030 
2,317 
--1.200 
Unaudited 
(in $000s) 
~ 
$ 798 
6,855 
13,247 
244 
$21 ,144 
19,070 
$40,214 
$ 11 ,925 
8,380 
2,190 
22,495 
17,719 
$40,214 
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$5 ,991 
2,247 
4,522 
Audited 
(in $000s) 
122.5. 
$ 387 
6,634 
12,760 
382 
$20, 163 
17,268 
$ 37,431 
$11 ,255 
8,408 
2,320 
21 ,983 
15,448 
$ 37,431 
Overview of Production Cycle 
A-1 Appliances generally has a good reputation for manufacturing quality products. A-1 does all of the 
metal work on their heaters, including the construction of the tanks from rolled steel. Valves and other 
small parts, such as thermostats, are purchased from outside suppliers. 
Products are manufactured in discrete batches for inventory as well as for special orders. A "normal" job 
cost system is utilized, i.e., jobs are assigned actual direct materials and direct labor costs and overhead 
based on a predetermined rate. Raw material and finished goods inventory valuation is determined by the 
FIFO method. 
Material is issued to production from the stores department only upon receipt of a properly authorized 
pre-numbered materials requisition. One copy of the requisition is maintained by the stores department, 
and another is sent to the inventory clerk for updating of the materials ledger cards and posting to the job 
cost sheets. 
Direct labor is assigned to jobs through the use of work tickets which are summarized weekly by job in a 
labor cost distribution summary. This summary is used to update job cost sheets at the end of each week. 
Manufacturing overhead is assigned to jobs using a plant-wide predetermined overhead rate which is 
developed at the beginning of each year. Common administrative costs are allocated to production, 
selling, and administrative functions through a step down procedure. Overhead is applied to jobs at the 
end of each week in conjunction with the direct labor update routine. Overhead is applied on the basis of 
direct labor dollars. 
A-1 employs a perpetual inventory system for all classes of inventory. A complete physical inventory is 
taken at year end. Additionally, periodic check counts are performed on an interim basis. In prior years 
the year end count had been well organized and executed, requiring about three days to complete. 
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Information Regarding Staff Member Performance 
Your assistant for this audit, Laura Smith, has fourteen months of audit experience. Although Laura has 
had prior manufacturing audit experience, she was new to the A-1 Appliances audit this year. Since 
starting with the firm Laura has performed well on other audit engagements, and she has a good 
reputation in the office for being competent and hard working. 
Imagine that you are reviewing Laura's work in the inventory area. In the past, other staff have not had 
much trouble meeting the inventory budget. However, this year, due to increasing fee pressures, THE 
BUDGET WAS SET CONSIDERABLY TIGHTER than in previous years. Consequently, you believed 
that it would be VERY DIFFICULT (in fact, nearly impossible) to meet the inventory budget. As a 
result, you were surprised when Laura completed the work within the budgeted amount of time and 
appeared to do a good job. 
During your review of the substantive tests conducted by Laura, however, you determine that she did not 
complete an audit step that she signed off. You are sure that Laura would have gone over budget if she 
had followed the intended audit program and conducted the specified procedures. Although you didn ' t 
realize it when you prepared the audit program, in considering this matter you reassess the importance of 
this audit step. You conclude that the audit step is unnecessary, because several other procedures in the 
program adequately test the area. 
When you discussed the matter with Laura, she said she INTENTIONALLY SKIPPED the step because 
she felt it was important to not go over budget and she thought the step was unnecessary. She believes 
that being able to perform within budget is rewarded by the firm. Thus, even though she knew she was 
prematurely signing off an audit step, she thought it was more important to finish within budget. Laura 
stated that she did not previously discuss the matter because she was unsure whether you, the in-charge 
auditor, would agree to the omission of the step. 
CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE 
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The following questions refer to your analysis of the A-1 Appliances Case 
1. How likely is it that you would require Laura to perform the audit step that she did not perform? 
(Circle one number) 
Extremely 
UNLIKELY 
that I would 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Extremely 
LIKELY 
that I would 
2. Given Laura' s performance as described in this case, how likely is it that your written evaluation of 
Laura would include the fact that she did not perform an audit step that she signed off? 
2 
Extremely 
LIKELY to include 
in written evaluation 
3 4 5 6 7 
Extremely UNLIKELY to 
include in written 
evaluation 
3. In your written evaluation of Laura's performance, how likely is it that you would evaluate her overall 
performance as "Unacceptable" because of the fact that she did not perform an audit step that she signed 
off? 
Extremely 
UNLIKELY to 
evaluate as 
"Unacceptable" 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Extremely 
LIKELY to 
evaluate as 
"Unacceptable" 
4. To what extent would you support Laura' s request to be assigned to you on another engagement? 
(That is, she initiates the request with scheduling.) 
Would NOT 
SUPPORT 
Laura's request 
2 3 4 5 
CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE 
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6 7 
Would strongly 
SUPPORT Laura' s 
request 
5. How frequently do you believe that audit staff members sign off audit steps that have not been 
performed? 
Occurs on almost 
EVERY audit 
engagement 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Almost NEVER 
OCCURS 
Case Scenario Information: Please respond to the following without looking back at the case 
description . 
1. The inventory time budget on the engagement this year was: 
VERY DIFFICULT TO MEET FAIRLY EASY TO MEET 
2. Laura prematurely signed off on the audit procedure: 
INTENTIONALLY UNINTENTIONALLY 
Discovery of Premature Sign Off: Please respond to the following based on your actual auditing 
experience. 
1. Have you ever determined that an audit staff member under your supervision INTENTIONALLY 
signed off an audit step that was not performed (i.e., did not do an audit step even though he or she knew 
it was required)? 
YES NO 
If yes, how many times has this occurred? times 
----
2. Have you ever determined that an audit staff member under your supervision UNINTENTIONALLY 
signed off an audit step that was not performed (i .e. , as a result of confusion concerning what needed to 
be done)? 
YES NO 
If yes, how many times has this occurred? times 
----
CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE 
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Biographical Data 
1. Approximately how many months have you been employed as an auditor in public accounting? 
months 
----
2. What percentage of your time has been spent on clients with inventory (whether manufacturing, 
wholesale, or retail)? 
% 
----
3. How many times have you been involved in the audit of the inventory area beyond simply observing 
the physical inventory (include separate years as separate times). 
times 
----
4. How would you assess your ability to evaluate the performance of a staff auditor? 
Extremely 
LOW 
2 3 4 5 6 
5. How many times have you evaluated the performance of a staff auditor? 
times 
----
6. What is your gender? 
MALE FEMALE 
CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE 
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7 
Extremely 
HIGH 
The questions on this page are designed to show some aspects of your personality. The questions do not have any " right" 
or "wrong" answers. They simply help to point out some characteristics of your personality. For each statement, select 
one of the seven responses that describes the way you feel or~- Mark your choice by circling the appropriate response. 
Use the following scale for all questions: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very true 
ofme 
Neither very 
true nor very 
untrue of me 
1. I hate giving up before I'm absolutely sure that I ' m beat. 
2 3 4 5 6 
2. Sometimes I feel that I shouldn ' t be working so hard, but something drives me on. 
2 3 4 5 6 
3. I thrive on challenging situations. The more challenges I have, the better. 
2 3 4 5 6 
4. In comparison to most people I know, I' m very involved in my work. 
2 3 4 5 6 
5. It seems as ifl need thirty hours a day to finish all the things I'm faced with . 
2 3 4 5 6 
6. In general, I approach my work more seriously than most people I know. 
2 3 4 5 6 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
Not at all 
true of me 
7. I guess there are some people who can be nonchalant about their work, but I'm not one of them. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. My achievements are considered to be significantly higher than those of most people I know. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I am persistent and competitive in everything I do. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION! 
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